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JUDICIALLY EXCEPTING THE LITERAL LOGIC IN
LEVIT: ADVOCATING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE FORTUITOUS RECIPIENT
EXCEPTION
Preference law, within the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), serves two pri-
mary purposes: (1) to constrain self-interested individuals from taking ac-
tion to the detriment of creditors, and (2) to promote the bankruptcy policy
of equality of distribution among all the creditors.' Essentially, a prefer-
ence is a transfer that enables a creditor to receive a greater percentage of
his claim than if he had participated in the distribution of the assets from
the bankruptcy estate.' A creditor's position may become preferred with
respect to the other creditors in two ways: (1) the creditor may act on his
own to advance his position,3 or (2) the debtor may advance the position of
one creditor over another to further the debtor's interests.4 Sections 547
and 550 of the Code were enacted "to prevent a creditor from changing,
alone or with the debtor's help, his existing position vis-a-vis other creditors
in anticipation of a bankruptcy proceeding."5
1. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6138; see also Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725
(1984). Mr. Jackson outlined the premise behind the Bankruptcy Code as follows: (1) to prevent
creditors from prematurely ripping apart the debtor's estate and thereby causing a bankruptcy
that may have been avoided, and (2) to achieve equal distribution among the creditors. Id. at 727-
31, 756-68.
2. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6138.
3. Under this scenario, a creditor may take various steps to obtain possession or control over
the property of the debtor. For example, the creditor may physically seize certain assets or the
creditor may force the debtor to relinquish title to certain assets. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 758.
4. Under this scenario, the debtor will try to foster a good working relationship with one or
more creditors for post-bankruptcy transactions. In order to facilitate his goal, the debtor will pay
his "favorite" creditors off prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. See id. at 759.
5. Id.
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Section 547(b)6 gives the bankruptcy trustee the power to avoid prefer-
ential transfers.7 Section 5508 gives the bankruptcy trustee the power to
recover the avoided preferential transfer from either the initial transferee or
the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.9 Absent the powers
created by section 547 and section 550, creditors might be tempted to "pre-
6. Section 547(b) provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer
was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
7. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 372 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6328; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5873. Subsection 547(b) is the operative provision of the section. It empowers the trustee to
avoid a transfer if all five conditions are satisfied. See supra note 6 for an enumeration of the five
conditions of section 547(b).
The party moving to avoid a transfer carries the burden of proving all five elements in section
547(b). 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988); see also Nordberg v. Arab Banking Corp. (In re Chase &
Sanborn Corp.), 904 F.2d 588, 595 n.15 (11 th Cir. 1990) (stating the plaintiff-trustee bears burden
of proving avoidability); Smith v. Mark Twain Nat'l Bank, 57 B.R. 373, 379 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1986) (stating burden of proof on trustee), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 805 F.2d 278 (8th Cir.
1986); Carlson v. Hughes (In re Aldridge), 94 B.R. 589, 591 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (trustee has
burden of proving each element of preferential transfer); Allegheny, Inc. v. Basic Packaging Sys.,
Inc. (In re Allegheny), 86 B.R. 466,468-69 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (stating the burden of proof is
on trustee or debtor-in-possession); Norman v. Jirdon Agri Chems., Inc. (In re Cockreham), 84
B.R. 757, 761 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1988) (stating trustee carries burden of proof by preponderance of
evidence).
8. Section 550(a) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided
under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may
recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders,
the value of such property, from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
9. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 375-76 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6331-32; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5876.
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maturely dismantle business entities whose precarious financial condition is
only temporary." 10
The interaction of sections 547(b) and 550(a)(1) appears simple. How-
ever, recent judicial decisions disagree on the correct concurrent application
of the two sections.11 The problem arises from the following hypothetical
situation: an outside creditor lends money to a corporation and takes the
personal guarantee of an "insider"' 2 on the note. More than ninety days
before the debtor files a petition for bankruptcy and while the debtor is
insolvent, the debtor makes payments to the outside creditor on the guaran-
teed note. Subsequently, the debtor files for bankruptcy and the trustee in
bankruptcy sues to avoid the payments under section 547(b)(4)(B) and to
recover the payments under section 550(a)(l). 13
10. Andrew J. Nussbaum, Comment, Insider Preferences and the Problem of Self-Dealing
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 603, 605 (1990).
11. See infra notes 18-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "two-transfers" the-
ory, the Deprizio literal interpretation, and the equity approach.
12. Section 101(31) provides:
(31) "insider" includes-
(A) if the debtor is an individual-
(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) general partner of the debtor; or
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(B) if the debtor is a corporation-
(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the
debtor;
(C) if the debtor is a partnership-
(i) general partner in the debtor;
(ii) relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in control of the
debtor;
(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) general partner of the debtor; or
(v) person in control of the debtor;
(D) if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or relative of an
elected official of the debtor;
(E) affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor; and
(F) managing agent of the debtor[.]
11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (Supp. II 1990).
13. If the transfer to the outside creditor had been made within ninety days of the filing of the
petition, the trustee's power to avoid the transfer is clear. Section 547(b)(4)(A) provides that the
trustee may avoid all payments made to any individual as long as they were made on or within
ninety days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988).
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On its face, section 547(b)(4)(B) does not seem to authorize avoiding the
transfer to the outside creditor. The outside creditor is not an insider and
the transfer was made more than ninety days before the date of the bank-
ruptcy petition. 14 Nevertheless, three circuit courts 15 have extended the
preference recovery period for outside creditors to one year when a pay-
ment produces a benefit for the inside guarantor. 6
Part I of this Comment outlines the three different approaches the
courts have adopted to address this problem. Part II discusses the proper
interpretation of a bankruptcy statute and evaluates the equitable powers of
a bankruptcy court. Finally, Part III discusses expanding the judicially cre-
ated "mere conduit" exception into the "fortuitous recipient" exception.
I. THE JUDICIAL APPROACHES
Three theories have evolved to deal with the interaction between sec-
tions 547 and 550 of the Code in the context of the problem outlined above:
(1) the "two-transfers" theory, (2) the "literal-interpretation" theory, and
(3) the "equitable" theory. As developed below, the first two theories are
problematic. The "two-transfers" theory unnecessarily stretches the statu-
tory language to achieve a desired end result, and the "literal-reading" the-
ory is too stringent in its application of the statutory language. The
"equitable" theory, although it is not the ideal solution, 7 accepts the literal
14. Section 547(b)(4)(B) authorizes avoiding a payment made to a creditor between ninety
days and one year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition if such creditor at the time of the
transfer was an "insider." See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
15. Ray v. City Bank and Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990);
Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989),
aff'g without op. 97 B.R. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874
F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
16. Under this scenario, the guarantor is the inside creditor benefiting from the payment to
the outside creditor. As a result, the trustee avoids the payments according to section
547(b)(4)(B) and recovers the payments from the bank under section 550(a)(1) as the initial trans-
feree of such transfer. The trustee is able to recover the transfer due to the outside creditor's
linkage with the guarantor. See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
17. This Comment does not address the issue of correcting this problem through the legisla-
ture. However, recently the United States Senate has proposed a bill that may effectively overrule
the decision in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). The Senate bill
proposes creating an eighth exception to section 547(c). The exception would read as follows:
(8) if the transfer sought to be recovered to an insider is on account of goods or services
sold and delivered to the debtor in the ordinary course of business and the transferee is
deemed to be an insider under section 101(31) solely because the transferee holds a guar-
anty of payment or performance from another insider of the debtor.
S. 1985, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1991). This proposal resolves legislatively what this Com-
ment advocates resolving judicially. See also Mark E. Toth, Comment, The Impossible State of
Preference Law Under the Bankruptcy Code: Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. and the
Problem of Insider-Guaranteed Debt, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1155, 1176-77 (1990).
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statutory language of section 547 on its face, but limits the reach of.section
550 by applying the bankruptcy court's equitable powers.
A. The Two-Transfers Theory
The court in Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corrugated Box Corp. (In re Mer-
con Industries, Inc.) 18 was the first to recognize the two-transfers theory. In
Mercon, two individuals and one corporation guaranteed payment of a debt,
owed by the debtor, to G.B. Goldman Paper Company ("Goldman").19 All
three guarantors were insiders of the debtor. Within one year before the
filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy, the debtor paid Goldman.20
Subsequently, the trustee moved to avoid the payments made to Goldman
as a preference under section 547(b) of the Code.
The Mercon court viewed the single transfer of funds to a noninsider
creditor as two transfers because of the secondary liability of the guaran-
tors.2 1 First, there was a direct transfer from the debtor to the lender in
satisfaction of the primary indebtedness. Second, there was an indirect
transfer to the insider guarantors by reducing their contingent liability.22
The direct transfer to the lender was not avoidable as a preference because
it was made to an outside creditor more than ninety days before filing.
However, the indirect transfer was avoidable because it extinguished the
contingent liability of the insider guarantors.
Although the initial transfer was a direct transfer to the lender, the lia-
bility of the guarantor under section 547(b) did not have to be based on a
finding of an avoidable transfer to the lender.23 Each transfer was in-
dependent of the other, as opposed to derivative.24
Normally, if a transfer is made to an insider, section 547(b)(4)(B) gives
the trustee the power to avoid the transfer beyond the ninety day period.
However, under the two-transfer theory, the lender is not an insider when
the transfer is made; the guarantor is the insider. Therefore, even though
section 550(a)(1) arms the trustee with the power to recover the transfer
from the lender as the "initial transferee", the trustee will not be able to do
18. 37 B.R. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989); see also Kellogg
v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586, 591-94 (5th Cir. 1987) (discuss-
ing the history of the direct and indirect transfer doctrine and its effect on line-of-credit cases),
reh g granted, 835 F.2d. 584 (5th Cir. 1988).
19. Mercon, 37 B.R. at 551.
20. Id.






so. The transfer to the lender is the result of a separate action and more-
over, the lender is not the "entity for whose benefit such transfer was
made. ,25
The preceding evaluation is problematic because the courts have mis-
placed their analysis of the definition of "transfer." Section 101(54) defines
"transfer" as "parting with the property or with an interest in property."26
This indicates that an initial transferee must receive the same property that
the transferor "parted with."' 27 As a result, the initial transfer from the
debtor to the lender constitutes one single transfer. 28
B. The Literal Interpretation Under Deprizio
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Finan-
cial Corp.,29 was the first circuit court to adopt a literal interpretation of the
interplay between sections 547(b)(4)(B) and 550(a)(1). In Levit, the
Deprizio Construction Company ("Company") borrowed money from sev-
eral different creditors.3" Richard Deprizio ("Deprizio"), the president of
Company, personally cosigned one note and guaranteed Company's debts
to the other creditors.3" Subsequently, Company began to experience finan-
cial difficulties. Company continued to make payments to its creditors,
25. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988); see also Henk J. Brands, Note, The Interplay between Sec-
tions 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 89 COLUM. L. Rav. 530, 535 (1989).
26. Section 101(54) provides:
(54) "transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, in-
cluding retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of
redemption[.]
11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (Supp. 11 1990).
27. Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 610; see also Brands, supra note 25, at 534-35.
28. The two-transfers theory contends that the property the guarantor receives is not the
same property the debtor parted with; "[r]ather, it is a consequence of the flow of property from
the debtor to the lender." Brands, supra note 25, at 535.
29. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g 86 B.R. 545 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988), revg sub nom.
Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986).
Initially, the bankruptcy court in Deprizio followed the two-transfers theory and denied recov-
ery under section 550(a)(1). On appeal, however, the district court overruled the bankruptcy
court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.
30. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1187. The Deprizio Company borrowed money from many sources
including: (1) the City of Chicago, (2) Ingersoll Rand Financial Corporation ("IRFC"), (3) CIT
Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. ("CIT"), and (4) Melrose Park Bank and Trust. Id.
31. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 B.R. 545, 549
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). As an officer of the Deprizio Com-
pany, Mr. Deprizio was an insider by definition. See supra note 12 for a full definition of "insider."
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however, until it filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.32 Following the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, the trustee filed adversary proceedings
against the outside creditors to avoid and recover payments received more
than ninety days but within the year before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.33
The principal question addressed in Levit was "whether the Trustee may
recover from an outside creditor under [section] 550(a)(1) a transfer more
than 90 days before the filing [of the petition] that is avoided under [section]
547(b) because of a benefit for an inside creditor. 34  Judge Easterbrook,35
writing for the Seventh Circuit, answered this question in the affirmative.36
In reaching his decision, Judge Easterbrook interpreted sections 547(b)
and 550(a)(1) literally. He began his analysis by applying four terms of art
to section 547(b)(4)(B): (1) "creditor," 37 (2) "claim, ' 38 (3) "insider, ' 39 and
32. The Deprizio Company made $168,000 in total payments in the year immediately prior to
its bankruptcy: $54,000 to CIT; $6,000 to AMEC; $108,000 to IRFC; and unknown amounts to
the Internal Revenue Service. id at 549.
33. The trustee also filed advisory proceedings against a pension and welfare fund and the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). Deprizio's payments to the IRS were for delinquent withhold-
ing taxes. This Comment will not consider the effects of avoiding the transfers to the pension fund
or the IRS. See Peter L. Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in
Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAW. 2151 (1990):
In the text of the Deprizio decision, Judge Easterbrook focuses for the most part on these
policy considerations, but at a critical juncture, when the insider preference provisions
appear to collide with the Internal Revenue Code, he veers off course and seeks refuge in a
highly technical-and ultimately misleading-distinction. The trouble is that Congress, to
discourage any financially troubled company from deferring payment of withholding tax,
has subjected certain corporate insiders to a 100% penalty in the event that withholding
tax is not paid. This penalty in effect provides the IRS with the statutory equivalent of an
insider guaranty and therefore with a potential one-year preference risk under the Deprizio
logic.
Id. at 2153-54 (footnotes omitted).
34. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1194.
35. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, who was appointed by President Reagan, began his term
with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on April 10, 1985. Judge Easterbrook earned a B.A.
with high honors in 1970 from Swarthmore College, and J.D. cum laude from the University of
Chicago in 1973. Judge Easterbrook was the Topics and Comment Editor for the University of
Chicago Law Review from 1971-73, was a law clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals First Circuit
from 1973-74, was the Assistant to the Solicitor General from 1974-77, and was Deputy Solicitor
General of the U.S. from 1978-79. He is also the author of two books and several law review
articles. THE AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION 29 (Marie T. Hough et al. eds., 6th ed.
1991-92).
36. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1201.
37. Section 101(10) provides:
(10) "creditor" means-
(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the
order for relief concerning the debtor;
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(4) "transfer."'  The argument to extend the insider recovery period to
outside creditors flows directly from these interlocked provisions.41 Section
101(31)(B)(ii) renders Deprizio an "insider,"'42 section 101(10)(A) states
that a "creditor" is anyone that has a "claim" against the debtor,43 and
section 101(5)(A) states that anyone with a contingent right to payment
holds a "claim." 44
Deprizio, by definition, was a creditor in Company's bankruptcy.
Deprizio, as the guarantor, had a contingent right to payment from Com-
pany if the lender collected from Deprizio rather than Company. This oc-
curs because Deprizio will succeed to the lender's right to collect from
Company in the event Deprizio pays Company's debt.45 Every payment
that Company makes to the lender will reduce Deprizio's exposure as a
guarantor. Therefore, the payments made to the lender are avoidable under
section 547(b)(4)(B) unless one of the exceptions in section 547(c) applies.46
(B) entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in section 348(d),
502(0, 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of this title; or
(C) entity that has a community claim[.]
11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (Supp. 11 1990).
38. Section 101(5) provides:
(5) "claim" means-
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to
a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured,
or unsecured[.]
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. 11 1990).
39. See supra note 12 for a full definition of "insider."
40. See supra note 26 for a full definition of "transfer."
41. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1190.
42. Deprizio is an insider of Company because Company is the debtor and Deprizio is an
officer of Company. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B)(ii) (Supp. 11 1990).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
45. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1190; see also Chittendon Trust Co. v. Sebert Lumber Co. (In re Ver-
mont Toy Works, Inc.), 82 B.R. 258 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987) rev'd, No. 88-44, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LExIs 19353 (D.C. Vt. Dec. 17, 1991). The Toy Works court defined a guarantee as an
"[e]nforceable undertaking or promise on the part of one person which is collateral to a primary
or principal obligation on the part of another, and which binds the obligor to performance in the
event of nonperformance by such other, the latter being bound to perform primarily." Id. at 324-
25 (footnotes omitted in original) (quoting 38 AM. JUR. 2d Guaranty § 2, at 997 (1968)).
46. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1190. Section 547(c) lists several exceptions to the avoidance power
found in section 547(b): (1) transfers made as a contemporaneous exchange for new value, (2)
transfers made in the ordinary course of business, (3) transfers that create a security interest in
property acquired by the debtor, (4) transfers made during the preference period, by both the
creditor and the debtor, are netted out-the difference being avoidable, (5) transfers during the
[Vol. 75:237
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After a trustee avoids the transfer to the creditor under section
547(b)(4)(B), the trustee recovers the avoided transfer under section
550(a)(1). Section 550(a)(1) empowers the trustee to recover from "the ini-
tial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made."'47 Section 547(b)(4) makes a distinction between insiders and
noninsiders,as but section 550(a)(1) does not. As a result, the trustee may
require the lender to repay the transferred funds it received as the initial
transferee, even though the lender received the funds more than ninety days
after filing, and it is not an insider.49
C. The Equitable Approach
Some courts have accepted the preceding literal approach when apply-
ing sections 547 and 550.o5 Other courts have accepted the literal approach
but have applied the bankruptcy court's equitable powers to prevent an in-
equitable result.5 In these cases equity is used to counter any injustice
which may result if a literal application of section 550(a)(1) occurs.52
The injustice results when unequal treatment is accorded to similarly
situated creditors. A creditor that obtains a guarantee from a corporate
preference period which evidence an improvement in position, (6) transfers that constitute the
fixing of a statutory lien, and (7) transfers that affect consumer debts to the extent of $600. See 11
U.S.C. § 547(c)(l)-(7) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373-74 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329-30; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874; see also supra note 17 concerning a Senate proposal adding an
eighth exception to section 547(c).
47. 11 U.S.C § 550(a)(1) (1988).
48. Noninsider transfers are only avoidable when made "on or within 90 days before the date
of the filing of the petition[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988).
Insider transfers are avoidable when made "between ninety days and one year before the date
of the filing of the petition . 1..." 1 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
49. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1190.
50. Ray v. City Bank and Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990);
Lowrey v. First Natl Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989),
aff'g without op. 97 B.R. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874
F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
The initial transfer to the lender is avoided under section 547(b) and then recoverable from the
lender as the initial transferee under section 550(a)(1).
51. Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n. (In re Midwestern Cos.), 96 B.R. 224
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 102 B.R. 169 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); Levit v. Melrose Park
Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 B.R. 545 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1988), aff'd, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 B.R. 77 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1985); Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 B.R. 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1983).
52. 4 ROBERT D'AGoSTINO ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 550.02, at 550-08 (Law-
rence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1992).
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insider is susceptible to the "insider" time period under section
547(b)(4)(B). 3 In contrast, a similarly situated creditor that does not ob-
tain a guarantee may receive funds within the same time period, but this
creditor will not be susceptible to the extended reach-back period.14
The courts adopting the equity approach have followed the Collier's
bankruptcy treatise in support of their holdings. Collier's provides:
In some circumstances, a literal application of section 550(a) would
permit the trustee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrong-
doing and deserves protection. In such circumstances the bank-
ruptcy court should use its equitable powers to prevent an
inequitable result. For example, if property is transferred to a good
faith surety or endorser as consideration incidental to the guarantee
of an antecedent debt of a creditor, and the surety subsequently pays
the creditor, the property or its value should be recovered from the
creditor for whose benefit the transfer was made rather than from
the surety or endorser to whom the transfer was made. Likewise, if a
transfer is made to a creditor who is not an insider more than ninety
days but within one year before bankruptcy and the effect is to prefer
an insider-guarantor, recovery should be restricted to the guarantor
and the creditor should be protected. Otherwise, a creditor who does
not demand a guarantor can be better off than one who does."
This approach has the greatest appeal. Historically, bankruptcy courts
have been given the authority to use their equitable powers when the word-
ing of a bankruptcy statute would cause an unintended or undesirable re-
sult.56 This Comment advocates using the bankruptcy court's equitable
53. See C-L Cartage, 899 F.2d at 1494-95; Robinson, 892 F.2d 850, aff'g without op. 97 B.R.
at 82; Levit, 874 F.2d at 1200-01; see also Borowitz, supra note 33, at 2151; William H. Lawrence,
Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Relational The-
ory of Secured Financing, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1387, 1404-10 (1989); Issac Nutovic, The Bank-
ruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(c)(2), 550(a)(1), and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus.
LAW. 175, 186-99 (1985); Brands, supra note 25, at 532-33; Nussbaum, Comment, supra note 10,
at 614; Toth, Comment, supra note 17, at 1156; see generally R. Jamison Williams, Jr. & Robert S.
Bick, Insider Guarantees: Emerging Theories and Preference Recoveries, 69 MIcH. BAR J. 691
(1990); Joseph A. Friedman, Comment, Lender Exposure Under 547 and 550: Are Outsiders Re-
ally Insiders, 44 S.W. L.J. 985 (1990); James A. Rodenberg, Comment, Indirect Preferences: Re-
covery Under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 55 Mo. L. REV. 327 (1990); Steve
Talbot, Note, Bankruptcy: Enhanced Preference Recovery Period for Outside Creditors with Inside
Guarantors, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 811 (1990).
54. D'AGOSTINO, supra note 52, at 550-8.
55. Id. (footnotes omitted).
56. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966). Contra Norwest Bank Worthington
v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) ("[WMhatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy
courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.").
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powers to expand the "mere conduit" exception by implementing the "for-
tuitous recipient" exception.57
II. EQUITY'S ROLE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The court, in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp.,58 interpreted sec-
tion 547(b)(4)(B) literally and rejected "equity's" role in the entire process.
However, in doing so the court failed to recognize two important factors:
(1) the proper procedure for interpreting a bankruptcy statute, and (2) eq-
uity's role in a bankruptcy case.
A. The Procedure for Interpreting a Bankruptcy Statute
The Supreme Court has laid down a distinctive procedure for the analy-
sis of a statute in the Bankruptcy Code.59 "[T]he 'starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.'" I How-
ever, the Court has indicated it does not want an overly literal interpreta-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code. "In expounding a statute, we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provi-
sions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." 1 Moreover, the
"plain meaning" contained in a statute of the Bankruptcy Code will not
control if enforcing that language "will produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters."'62
A bankruptcy court is not confined to a literal interpretation when it
attempts to analyze a bankruptcy statute. The Supreme Court, in Bank of
Marin v. England,63 held that "we do not read these statutory words with
the ease of a computer. There is an overriding consideration that equitable
principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction."" Therefore, it is
apparent that a court interpreting a bankruptcy statute must first look to
57. See infra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
58. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g 86 B.R. 545 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1988), rev'g sub nom.
Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986).
59. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
60. Id. at 43 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
61. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43 (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221
(1986)) (in turn quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956)) (in turn
quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849)).
62. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 243 (1989) (quoting Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
63. 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
64. Marin, 385 U.S. at 103 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939); Securities &
Exch. Comm'n v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940)).
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the language of the statute, while remaining conscious of the fact that eq-
uity may intervene in the final analysis. In Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 65 and Kelly v. Robinson,66
the Supreme Court adhered to the preceding procedure when it resolved
ambiguities in the Code by side-stepping a literal reading of certain bank-
ruptcy statutes.67
In Midlantic, Quanta Resources Corporation ("Quanta") processed
waste oil at facilities located in New York and New Jersey. The New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") discovered that
Quanta had violated its operating permit by accepting toxic waste oil. Dur-
ing negotiations with NJDEP, Quanta filed for protection under Chapter 11
of the Code and, after NJDEP ordered a cleanup, Quanta converted from
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7.68 Subsequently, the trustee abandoned the two
properties pursuant to section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which autho-
rizes a trustee to "abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to
the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 69
The Supreme Court denied the trustee's abandonment claim and
thereby obviated a literal reading of section 554(a). Instead, the Court
looked to judicial precedent and to congressional practice. Judicial prece-
dent revealed that a "Bankruptcy Court [could invoke] its equitable power
65. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
66. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
67. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
The majority stated that Midlantic and Kelly concerned statutory language which, at
least to some degree, was open to interpretation. Each involved a situation where bank-
ruptcy law, under the proposed interpretation, was in clear conflict with state or federal
laws of great importance. In the present case, in contrast, the language in question is
clearer than the language at issue in Midlantic and Kelly ....
Id. at 245. Contra id. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The Court characterizes Midlantic as involving "a situation where bankruptcy law, under
the proposed interpretation, was in clear conflict with state or federal laws of great impor-
tance." Though I agree with that characterization, I think there is more to Midlantic than
conflict with state or federal laws. Contrary to the Court's intimation, Midlantic did not
"concer[n] statutory language which.., was open to interpretation." The language of
§ 544(a) is "absolute in its terms," and the court in Midlantic did not attempt to argue
otherwise.
Id. at 252 (alteration and omission in original) (citations omitted).
68. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497. Following Quanta's Chapter 7 filing, an investigation of the
New York facility revealed that Quanta had also accepted toxic waste at the New York plant. Id.
69. Section 554(a) provides: "(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate." I 1 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
In Midlantic, the city and state of New York objected to the trustee's abandonment, contend-
ing that abandonment would threaten the public's health and safety, and would violate state and
federal environmental law. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498.
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to 'safeguard the public interest' .. ."I' Moreover, the Court found sup-
port for restricting the abandonment power from "repeated congressional
emphasis on its 'goal of protecting the environment against toxic
pollution.' "71
Similarly, in Kelly, the Court did not adopt a literal reading of "debt" in
discharging criminals seeking to avoid the penalties for their crimes.72
Robinson, the defendant, was found guilty of wrongful receipt of welfare
benefits, and the state court ordered her to make restitution through
monthly payments.73 Subsequently, Robinson filed a voluntary petition
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code listing the restitution as a debt.74
Even though a literal reading of the definition of "debt" would have ren-
dered the restitution payment dischargeable, the Kelly Court held that resti-
tution imposed in a state criminal action was nondischargeable in a
proceeding under Chapter 7.75
The Court's determination resulted from an interpretation of Code sec-
tion 523(a)(7), which excepts from discharge a debt that is "a fine, penalty,
or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is
not compensation for actual pecuniary loss."76 Restitution, the Court con-
cluded, was not "for the benefit of" the state, nor was it "for... compensa-
tion of the victim." 77 But rather, restitution was for "the penal and
rehabilitative interests of the State." 78 As a result, the Court abandoned a
70. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501 (quoting In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BCD 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1974)). The bankruptcy court in Lewis required the debtor public utility to seal underground
steam lines before abandoning them. Id
71. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505 (quoting Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 143 (1985)).
72. Section 101(12) provides that "debt" means liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12)
(Supp. 11 1990); see supra note 38 for a full definition of "claim."
The Second Circuit read the definition of "debt" literally. In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1985). However, the Supreme Court in Kelly overruled the Second Circuit's interpretation. Kelly
v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
73. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 38-39.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 50-53. Contra Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552
(1990). In Davenport, the Court held that restitution obligations constituted "debts" within the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and, therefore, that such obligations were dischargeable in pro-
ceedings under Chapter 13. The Supreme Court distinguished Davenport from Kelly, stating Kelly
dealt with a Chapter 7 problem, whereas Davenport was a Chapter 13 problem. Davenport, 495
U.S. at 555.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1988).




literal interpretation of section 523(a)(7) to effectuate both congressional
intent and societal interests.79
Judge Easterbrook, in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 0 ad-
dressed Midlantic and Kelly stating that the two cases resolved ambiguities
in the Code in a manner that was consistent with the ideology of the rest of
bankruptcy law and nonbankruptcy entitlements. 81 However, Judge Eas-
terbrook refused to apply the same standard in Levit, stating that "It]here is
no similarly enduring policy concerning the length of the preference-recov-
ery period for outside creditors or the relation between insiders' guarantees
and the preference-recovery period. An extended recovery period is consis-
tent with the structure of the Code and does not subvert any of its func-
tions." 2 This interpretation is not acceptable given the congressional
distinction between insiders and noninsiders in section 547.
B. The Insider/Noninsider Distinction
The bankruptcy court, in Block v. Texas Commerce Bank National
Ass'n (In re Midwestern Cos.), 83 attempted to deal with the results of a lit-
eral interpretation of the interplay between sections 547 and 550. It looked
at the distinction Congress drew between insider and noninsider in section
547 and concluded that this distinction should survive the application of
section 550.84 Sections 547(b)(4)(A) & (B) differentiate between a nonin-
sider and an insider.85 They impose a different time limitation for avoiding
preferences following the filing of a bankruptcy petition: ninety days and
one year respectively. Section 550 empowers the trustee to recover the
avoided preferences identified by section 547, but it makes no distinction
between insiders and noninsiders.86
79. Id. at 50, 53. The Court supported its position stating:
Nowhere in the House and Senate Reports is there any indication that this language should
be read so intrusively. If Congress had intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any other provision,
to discharge state criminal sentences, "we can be certain that there would have been hear-
ings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so inimical to purposes
previously deemed important and so likely to arouse public outrage[.]"
Id. at 50-51 (footnote omitted) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 209 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
80. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g 86 B.R. 545 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988), revg sub nom.
Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986).
81. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1197.
82. Id.
83. 102 B.R. 169 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
84. Id. at 173.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1988).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
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The problem arises when a court follows the literal reading adopted in
Levit. The literal approach in Levit caused noninsider creditors to be in-
cluded in the extended avoidance period established for insiders by section
547(b)(4)(B). Midwestern interpreted this as contrary to legislative intent-
if the statutes were intended to be interpreted in this manner, the distinction
between insiders and noninsiders in section 547 would be moot when the
court enforces the recovery power under section 550.17 Therefore, Midwest-
ern held that "[ilf recovery is to be made under Section 550, it must be
made in light of the distinction drawn by Section 547 in designating which
disbursements can be avoided and who will be liable for recovery. '88
The Midwestern court's interpretation is very convincing after a close
evaluation of section 550. Section 550(a)(1) reads as follows:
§ 550. Liability of transferee of avoided transfer
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent
that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549,
553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the
benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so
orders, the value of such property, from
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for
whose benefit such transfer was made... 89
Nowhere in this section does it distinguish between insiders and nonin-
siders. The only avoidance section enumerated in section 550 that does dis-
tinguish between insider and noninsider is section 547.90 Moreover, the
legislative history is silent concerning the interplay of sections 547 and
87. Midwestern, 102 B.R. at 173.
88. Id.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
90. Section 550 enumerates seven sections over which the trustee may recover avoided trans-
fers:
(1) Section 544(a) is a "strong arm" section that "gives the trustee the rights of a creditor on
a simple contract with a judicial lien on the property of the debtor... ; of a creditor with a writ of
execution against the property of the debtor... ; and a bona fide purchaser of the real property of
the debtor. .. ." Section 544(b) "gives the trustee the rights of actual unsecured creditors under
applicable law to void transfers." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6326; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5871;
(2) Section 545 "permits the trustee to avoid the fixing of certain statutory liens." H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6327; S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5871;
(3) Section 547:
[a]uthorizes the trustee to avoid a transfer if five conditions are met .... Fourth, the
transfer must have been made during the 90 days immediately preceding the commence-
ment of the case. If the transfer was to an insider, the trustee may avoid the transfer if it
was made during the period that begins one year before the filing of the petition and ends
90 days before the filing.
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550.91 Nevertheless, it seems plausible that when Congress distinguished
between insiders and noninsiders in section 547 it intended that distinction
to be carried through to section 550.
Even though the "plain meaning" in sections 547 and 550 can be con-
strued to authorize extending the recovery powers to noninsiders, enforcing
that language might produce a result at odds with the intentions of the
drafters.92 As a result, a court evaluating the literal effects of the interplay
between the two statutes must also look at the object and policy of the
statute93 while keeping in mind the overriding principles of equity.94
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 372 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6328;
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5873;
(4) Section 548 "permits the trustee to avoid transfers by the debtor in fraud of his creditors."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6331;
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5875;
(5) Section 549 "permits the trustee to avoid transfers of property that occur after the com-
mencement of the case." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6331; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5876;
(6) Section 724(a) "permits the trustee to avoid a lien that secures a fine, penalty, forfeiture, or
multiple, punitive, or exemplary damages claim to the extent that the claim is not compensation
for actual pecuniary loss." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 382 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6338; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5882.
91. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 372 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6328; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 375 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6331.
92. Cf United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). Even though the
legislative history is silent, when Congress enacted section 547 it differentiated between insiders
and noninsiders for a reason. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
93. The degree of control asserted by the lender over the guarantor is paramount in assessing
the object and policy of the interplay between sections 547 and 550. Between a lender with a
guarantee and one without, absent an increased degree of control over the insider, equity should
be applied to prohibit an extension of the preference recovery period. See infra notes 141-59 and
accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text; see also Nutovic, supra note 53.
No argument based on the plain meaning of section 550(a)(1) alone is likely to prevail
in the face of strong equitable considerations. When faced with the choice of enforcing the
clear wording of a bankruptcy statute or avoiding an inequitable and possibly unintended
result, the Supreme Court has unhesitatingly opted for disregarding the statute and doing
equity. The argument that equitable exceptions to statutory commands are undesirable
because they lead to situations "conducive of confusion and uncertainty, with potentialities
for argument, 'bluffing', litigation, expense and delay" is apparently not sufficiently persua-
sive. If a particular application of the statute would be grossly unjust and was not clearly
intended by the legislature, the courts will deviate from the literal reading of a statute.
Therefore, one must take the respective equities of the parties into account.
Nutovic, supra note 53, at 195 (footnotes omitted).
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C. Equity in the Bankruptcy Court
A bankruptcy court, for many purposes, is essentially a court of eq-
uity.95 As a court of equity, a bankruptcy court can exercise its powers to
deal with a wide range of problems, but the public interest must always be
at the heart of any decision. "A court of equity may in its discretion in the
exercise of the jurisdiction committed to it grant or deny relief upon per-
formance of a condition which will safeguard the public interest." 96 How-
ever, this power does not "authorize a freewheeling consideration of every
considerable equity.' 97 In order to effectively safeguard the public's inter-
est, a bankruptcy court must balance the equities and consider any type of
evidence relevant to the issue.98
Congress effectively affirmed the role of equity in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing when it enacted and later amended section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code gives bankruptcy judges the power to
act on their own to prevent an abuse of process. The second sentence of
section 105(a)99 was amended in 1986 to read as follows:
§ 105. Power of court
(a) The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is nec-
essary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No
provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in
interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, tak-
ing any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate
95. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
240 (1934)).
96. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434,
455 (1940).
97. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
98. Id.
99. Section 105 provides:
§ 105. Power of court
(a) The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropri-
ate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua
sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce
or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a court may not appoint a receiver
in a case under this title.
(c) The ability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a district court to
exercise any of the authority or responsibilities conferred upon the court under this title
shall be determined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge, officer, or em-
ployee set forth in title 28. This subsection shall not be interpreted to exclude bankruptcy
judges and other officers or employees appointed pursuant to chapter 6 of title 28 from its
operation.
11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
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to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse
of process. O
The addition to section 105(a) clearly indicates that Congress intended to
allow courts to initiate action.
The purpose of the extended avoidance period in section 547(b)(4)(B) is
to prevent a self-interested insider from transferring funds in order to im-
prove his position when he knows insolvency is imminent."l ' There may
also be circumstances in which the insider transfers funds due to the control
exercised by an outside creditor.'I 2 In this case, recovering from the "ini-
tial transferee" is justified-the creditor forced the transaction. However,
when a guarantee is used by an outside creditor, it is not always applied to
exercise extreme control over the insider. 10 3 The guarantee may work as
insurance against a free-wheeling sole shareholder in a closely-held
corporation.
The insider as sole shareholder enjoys the security of limited liability."°4
In this situation, a great deal of the risk remains with the lender. If a per-
sonal guarantee is not obtained by the creditor, the insider may pursue high
risk ventures and if successful, reap the rewards. However, if the venture
fails and the liability reaches beyond the capital of the corporation, the in-
sider knows that the liability chain ends with the corporation.'0 5 A per-
sonal guarantee, on the other hand, distributes the risk and insures that the
insider will not recklessly use the borrowed funds. The lender does not
exercise any more control in this situation than a lender without a personal
guarantee does. Nevertheless, a transfer to the lender holding a guarantee
over an insider is recoverable up to a year prior to bankruptcy, while it is
100. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
101. See generally Jackson, supra note 1.
102. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
103. 3A STEPHEN M. FLANAGAN & CHARLES R.P. KEATING, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1119 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1986); 13A CORA M. THOMP-
SON, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6219.
104. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 24-25 (2d
ed. 1986). "The protection against unlimited liability for business obligations provided by the
corporate form is often stressed as a significant reason for incorporating a business." Id. at 24.
105. The general rule regarding corporations provides that liability ends at the corporate
level, thus insulating the shareholders. However, this rule assumes that the shareholders have not
violated any principles that would warrant piercing the corporate veil. See Consumer's Co-op. v.
Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 483-84, 419 N.W.2d 211, 217 (1988) ("[B]oth inadequate capitalization
and disregard of corporate formalities are significant to a determination of whether the corpora-
tion has a separate existence such that shareholders can claim the accoutrement of incorporation:
nonliability for corporate debts.").
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only recoverable up to ninety days prior to bankruptcy from the lender
without the personal guarantee."0 6
Judge Easterbrook discarded the principle that personal guarantees are
used to equalize the risk. He proposed that the risk factor should be com-
pensated for by using the interest rates.107 If a longer preference period is
favorable to the debt-adjustment process, or even if the longer preference
period is unfavorable, interest rates will adjust to compensate for the change
in risk.10 Specifically, the Levit court held that "[a] rule may injure debtors
and creditors by foreclosing efficient business arrangements and increasing
the rate of interest low-risk borrowers must pay, but inefficiency is not ineq-
uity." 9 This proposal may compensate the bank's risk requirements, but
it does nothing for the borrower. The increased interest rate will cause
otherwise plausible projects to be rejected. The higher cost of debt will
require an equally higher rate of return to induce many small companies to
expand. As a result, many of these companies will be forced to scratch
projects because the return is too low to merit taking the risk.
It is this type of situation that equity asserted through section 105 was
designed to guard against. "In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction the
bankruptcy court has the power to sift the circumstances surrounding any
claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of the
bankrupt estate."' 10 A lender who equalizes risk through a guarantee and
asserts the same level of control over the debtor and the guarantor, as a
lender without a guarantee, should not have to face recovery under section
550.
III. THE "MERE CONDUIT" EXCEPTION SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO
ENCOMPASS THE "FORTUITOUS RECIPIENT" EXCEPTION
A literal interpretation of sections 547(b) and 550(a)(1) clearly creates
situations of inequity. Recently, several courts have judicially created the
"mere conduit" exception when confronted with an inequitable result from
applying section 547. The remainder of this Comment will discuss the
"mere conduit" exception and suggest that in the interest of equity, the
106. See D'AoSTINO, supra note 52, at 550-8.
107. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g 86 B.R.
545 (Bankr. N.D. IIl. 1988), rev'g sub nom. Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio
Constr. Co.), 58 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Patterson, 825 F.2d
1140, 1142 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987)).
110. Pepper v. Linton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1939).
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same courts should expand the "mere conduit" exception into the "fortui-
tous recipient" exception.
A. The "'Mere Conduit" Exception
Even though several courts have adopted the literal interpretation ap-
plied in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 1 they have also accepted
the "mere conduit" exception. A purely literal interpretation of the recov-
ery powers of section 550(a)(1) seems to be too narrow to encompass all
circumstances. Several circuit courts 1 2 and several lower courts' 3 have
agreed with this proposition. In order to prevent an abuse of the recovery
powers within section 550(a)(1), these courts have followed the Supreme
Court's lead in Midlantic and Kelly.'1 4 These courts have created the
"mere conduit" exception. The label applies to third parties that have held
avoidably transferred funds in good faith and who have no real rights to, or
control over, the funds which are intended to be received by another
party." 15
1. The Lower Courts
The first court to discuss the "mere conduit" exception was in In re
Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc. I 6 In Fabric Buys, the debtor paid one of his
creditors for certain goods sold and delivered prior to bankruptcy. The
debtor transferred the funds to the creditor's attorney, who deposited the
funds in his client escrow account and approximately two weeks later for-
111. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g 86 B.R. 545 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988), revg sub norn.
Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986).
112. See Nordberg v. Societe Generale (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 848 F.2d 1196 (11th
Cir. 1988); Huffman v. Commerce Sec. Corp. (In re Harbour), 845 F.2d 1254 (4th Cir. 1988);
Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
113. Duvoisin v. Kennerly, Montgomery, Howard & Finley (In re Southern Indus. Banking
Corp.), 99 B.R. 827 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989), aff'd in part, 115 B.R. 930 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1990), modified, 126 B.R. 294 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991); Jet Florida, Inc. v. Airlines Clearing
House, Inc. (In re Jet Florida System, Inc.), 69 B.R. 83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d
1555 (11th Cir. 1988); Metsch v. City Nat'l Bank (In re Colombian Coffee Co.), 64 B.R. 585
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); Metsch v. First Alabama Bank (In re Colombian Coffee Co.), 59 B.R.
643 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 75 B.R. 177 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A.
(In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc.), 33 B.R. 334 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
114. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text. In Kelly and Midlantic, the Supreme
Court opted not to employ a literal interpretation of a specific bankruptcy statute when applying it
to the facts of the case.
115. David I. Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550: Extended Preference Ex-
posure Via Insider Guarantees, and Other Perils of Initial Transferee Liability, 45 Bus. LAW. 511,
525-26 (1990).
116. 33 B.R. 334 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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warded the funds to the creditor.117 The trustee tried to avoid the payment
under section 547(b) and recover the payment from the creditor's attorney
as the "initial transferee" under section 550(a)(1). The court, however, re-
jected the trustee's contention that the term "initial transferee" should be
read literally. The court held that the attorney, through his client escrow
account, was a "mere conduit" for the funds.1 i s The fact that the payment
"was funneled through the escrow account does not make [the creditor's]
lawyer an initial transferee."'1 9 As a result, the trustee was unable to re-
cover the transfers from the lawyer.
In Metsch v. First Alabama Bank (In re Colombian Coffee Co.), 120 the
bank received transfers for deposit in a customer's account. The trustee
tried to recover the funds under sections 547(b) and 550(a)(1). However,
the bankruptcy court denied the trustee's request and held that the bank
was not an "initial transferee" but rather a mere "commercial conduit" of
the funds. 21 Similarly, in Metsch v. City National Bank (In re Colombian
Coffee Co.), 122 the bank was the recipient of transferred funds, but this time
the debtor controlled and dominated the bank. Nevertheless, the bank-
ruptcy court held that the bank was a mere "commercial conduit" and de-
nied the trustee's request to recover the transferred funds. 123
2. The Circuit Courts
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Huffman v. Commerce Security
Corp. (In re Harbour),124 adopted the "mere conduit" exception, but never-
theless granted recovery due to the "bad faith" of the initial recipient. In
Harbour, the debtor transferred $179,450 to the "initial transferee," who
subsequently transferred the funds to her son. 2 The mother-initial trans-
feree had not held the funds for longer than a day, nor did she ever receive
any compensation for the transaction. The court first stated that it looked
with approval at the line of lower courts that "recognize that the initial
recipient of funds from a debtor may not always be an 'initial transferee'
within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. [section] 550(a)(1)." 126 However, in order
117. Id. at 335.
118. Id. at 337.
119. Id.
120. 59 B.R. 643 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 75 B.R. 177 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
121. Id. at 645.
122. 64 B.R. 585 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
123. Id. at 586.
124. 845 F.2d 1254 (4th Cir. 1988).
125. Id. at 1254-55.
126. Id. at 1258; see Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys Inc.), 33 B.R. 334 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983); Metsch v. First Alabama Bank (In re Colombian Coffee Co.), 59 B.R. 643
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for the initial recipient to escape a literal reading of section 550(a)(1), "[the]
party must have acted in 'good faith' with respect to the relevant transac-
tion."' 127 Here, the initial recipient's willful ignorance and failure to investi-
gate did not indicate good faith on her part. 12  As a result, the initial
recipient became an "initial transferee" within section 550(a)(1), and there-
fore, the trustee could recover the transferred funds.
Even Judge Easterbrook from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Bonded Financial Services v. European American Bank,'29 did not strictly
interpret the "initial transferee" language in section 550(a)(1). In Bonded,
the court denied recovery from a bank that received a check from the
debtor, payable to the bank's order, with instructions to deposit the check
in the depositor's account. 130 The bank was the initial recipient; however,
the court held the bank was neither the "initial transferee" nor the "entity
for whose benefit [the] transfer was made."' 13 ' The trustee, therefore, could
not recover the amount of the check from the bank as a fraudulent convey-
ance.' 32 The bank received no benefit, but rather acted as an intermediary
for the purpose of fulfilling the instructions of the debtor: to make the
funds available to someone else. As a result, the depositor rather than the
bank was the "initial transferee."'' 33
The judge-made "mere conduit" exception is a clear example of an equi-
table approach to the application of the Bankruptcy Code. This exception
should be expanded to include what has been coined the "fortuitous recipi-
ent" exception. '3' The "fortuitous recipient" exception would apply to
"any initial recipients whose relationship to a transaction is not logically
linked to the elements that allow the trustee to avoid the transfer."'' 35
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 75 B.R. 177 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); Metsch v. City Nat'l Bank (In
re Colombian Coffee Co.), 64 B.R. 585 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
127. Harbour, 845 F.2d at 1258.
128. Id.
129. 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
130. Id. at 893. The depositor was an insider of the debtor and a borrower of the bank. The
depositor then directed the bank to credit the funds toward payment of his own secured loan from
the bank. Id. at 891.
131. Id. at 893-96 (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 893-94. Judge Easterbrook could have stringently enforced the statutory language
of section 547 and forced recovery from the bank. However, he held that both the financial and
social costs upon the bank would have been too great. The initial recipient would have been
required to monitor all transfers. Moreover, the initial recipient would have been liable for all
transfers avoided under section 547. Id.
134. Katzen, supra note 115, at 526.
135. Id. The phrase "fortuitous recipient" was developed and coined by Mr. David I. Katzen,
a California attorney practicing with McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enerson in the firm's Walnut
Creek and San Francisco offices. Id.
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B. The Fortuitous Recipient Exception
1. Rebutting the Presumption of "Initial Transferee"
The "fortuitous recipient" exception places the burden on the initial re-
cipient to prove that he qualifies as a "fortuitous recipient." 136 The evalua-
tion would proceed under the theory of presumptions.1 3 7 Initially, the
trustee will have the burden to prove the basic facts-the five elements of
section 547(b). 131 The establishment of the basic facts will give rise to the
mandatory presumed fact-that the holder of an insider guarantee, who
receives a preferential payment more than ninety days following insolvency,
was in sufficient control over the guarantor to merit recovery of the pay-
ment under section 550(a)(1). Subsequently, the burden of production will
shift to the initial recipient to rebut the presumed fact. 139 If the initial re-
cipient can produce sufficient evidence to prove that the transfer did not
occur because of leverage asserted on the guarantor by the lender, "the logi-
cal link would be broken, and the creditor would be protected as a fortui-
tous recipient."1"4' However, if the initial recipient cannot produce enough
136. Katzen, supra note 115, at 525-26.
137. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 56 (2d ed.
1987) (footnote omitted) ("[A] genuine presumption is raised by a basic fact or facts that, when
accepted as true by the trier, give rise to a mandatory inference, properly called a presumed
fact.").
138. This procedure will not place any additional requirements on the trustee. In order to
avoid a transfer in the first place, the trustee carries the burden of proving the five conditions of
section 547(b). Section 547(g) provides: "For the purposes of this section, the trustee has the
burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b) of this section ... 11
U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988).
The five conditions found in subsection (b) are: (1) the transfer must be to or for the benefit of
a creditor; (2) the transfer must be on account of an antecedent debt; (3) the transfer must have
been made when the debtor was insolvent; (4) the transfer must have been made during the ninety
days immediately preceding the filing of the petition, unless the transfer was to an insider, then the
time period is one year; and (5) the transfer must enable the creditor to receive a greater percent-
age of his claim than he would have received under a normal distribution. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1)-
(5) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 372 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6328; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5873.
139. See FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 301, which provides:
RULE 301. PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL IN CIVIL AcTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by
these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such
party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains through-
out the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EVID. 301.
140. Katzen, supra note 115, at 526; see also Tidwell v. Amsouth Bank (In re Cavalier
Homes, Inc.), 102 B.R. 878 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989). In Tidwell, the trustee claimed that the
bank was an insider because of its involvement with the finances of the debtor. The bank required
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evidence, he will be considered an "initial transferee" and susceptible to the
recovery powers of section 550(a)(1).
The fortuitous recipient test will focus on the level of control the credi-
tor asserts over the guarantor. Assessing the level of the lender's control
over the guarantor brings the whole analysis closer to the policy of section
547(b)(4)3(B). Section 547(b)(4)(B) differentiates between insiders and non-
insiders.14 ' The legislative history of section 101(31) indicates that "[a]n
insider is one who has a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor [such]
that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at
arms length with the debtor." 142 As a result, even though the transfer to
the initial recipient could be avoided, the absence of bad faith in control
over the debtor would preclude recovery from the lender under section
550(a)(1).
The bankruptcy courts "could use inherent common law or equitable
powers to develop norms on a case by case basis . . 1,43 The bankruptcy
courts already use common law to determine when an outside creditor's
claim is equitably subordinated. The same procedure could easily be imple-
mented in preference law.
2. The Control Factor in Equitable Subordination
The doctrine of equitable subordination developed as an equitable de-
fense to the allowance of certain claims.'" "The exercise of this equitable
the debtor to submit frequent periodic reports on accounts receivable, invoices, inventory, sales
journals, and delivery schedules. In addition, the bank received all payments on the debtor's
accounts and endorsed customers' checks. Nevertheless, the Tidwell court held that "[the exer-
cise of financial control of a creditor over a debtor incident to a creditor-debtor relationship does
not make the creditor an insider even though a creditor may obtain some concessions from the
debtor based on the relationship." Id. at 883-84.
141. The preference recovery period is extended from ninety days to one year if the "creditor
at the time of such transfer was an insider." 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
142. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6269; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5810. The legislative history continues, stating that "[iff the debtor is a corporation, then a
controlling person... [is an] insider[ ]." Id. at 5811; see also Huizar v. Bank of Robstown (In re
Huizar), 71 B.R. 826 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987) (stating purpose of insider provisions is to protect
general creditors from overreaching by those with special power or influence over the debtor); In
re Belco, Inc., 38 B.R. 525 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984) (refusing to find insider control by a credi-
tor-bank, stating that the bank possessed no stranglehold on the debtor so as to render the debtor
powerless to act independently of the bank).
143. Katzen, supra note 115, at 529.
144. Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as
Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. LAw. 417, 421 (1985).
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power is governed ... by rules of fair play and good conscience." 4 ' Equi-
table subordination is commonly applicable to inside creditors. However,
when an outside creditor assumes a sufficient level of control over the
debtor, that creditor will be held to the same rigid standard as that of an
inside creditor. 46 The exact point at which the creditor "tips the balance of
the scales" is difficult to determine. 47 Nevertheless, the courts have devel-
oped, vis-a-vis common law,148 guidelines to assess the situation.
I The cases that have upheld subordination of a noninsider creditor's
claim have been influenced by several factors. In Fruehauf Corp. v. T.E.
Mercer Trucking Co. (In re TE. Mercer Trucking),149 the court based its
decision on representation on the board of directors, veto power over daily
decisions, joint control of bank accounts, power to regulate officers' salaries,
and the right to force liquidation of assets.150 In Bergauist v. First National
Bank (In re American Lumber Company),"'1 the bank totally controlled
management, cut employee salaries, forced liquidation, fired employees, su-
pervised and restricted payments to other creditors, and assumed total con-
trol over the debtor's bank account. 152
These cases seem to indicate that the level of control must be such that
when the debtor becomes the mere alter ego or instrumentality of the
noninsider creditor, that creditor may be treated as an insider. The nonin-
sider creditor exercised such control and influence over the debtor that
transactions between the two were not at arm's length." 3 However, this
does not mean that a creditor cannot take any steps to monitor the business
operations of the debtor."5 "It is only when the creditor transcends the
traditional debtor-creditor relationship and controls the actual operation of
the debtor that the courts have seen fit to hold the creditor to a higher
standard of conduct." '55 Normally, in the case of equitable subordination,
the objectant to an inside creditor's claim must come forward with evidence
to support subordination, and then the burden would shift to the inside
145. Id. at 419; see also 3 Roy BABIT ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 510.05, at 510-
15 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1992).
146. DeNatale & Abram, supra note 144, at 432.
147. Id. at 434.
148. Id.
149. 16 B.R. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
150. Id. at 189-90.
151. 5 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980), aff'g 7 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D. Minn: 1979).
152. Id. at 472-74.
153. Burner v. Security State Bank (In re Burner), 109 B.R. 216, 228 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989).




creditor to show the fairness of his claim.156 However, in cases involving
noninsider creditors, the burden remains on the objectant.' 57
The shifting burden of production outlined above is similar to the proce-
dure set forth in the "fortuitous recipient" exception.15 8 However, the ini-
tial burden in an equitable subordination remains with the objectant
whereas the initial burden on the trustee in the "fortuitous recipient" excep-
tion shifts to the noninsider creditor.
The trustee in the "fortuitous recipient" exception has only to establish
the five requirements contained within section 547(b). 5 9 Thereafter, the
initial recipient will have the burden of production to show that the transfer
was received in good faith. Hence, if the creditor-initial recipient cannot
rebut the presumption of control, its status would be elevated to an insider
and therefore susceptible to the one-year extended recovery period.
IV. CONCLUSION
The literal approach taken by Judge Easterbrook' 60 in Levit v. Ingersoll
Rand Financial Corp. 161 sent shock waves through the lending community.
Lenders do not know whether or not they should continue the practice of
requiring guarantees.1 62 On the other hand, creditors without guarantees
benefit for two reasons. First, if a loan guaranteed by an insider is paid
back to the lender during the ninety days to one-year insolvency period, the
lender will have to return the funds to the trustee.163 This occurs even if the
loan was paid back to the lender in good faith. ' Second, the creditors
156. See BABT, supra note 145, at 510-15.
157. Bank of New Richmond v. Production Credit Ass'n (In re Osborne), 42 B.R. 988, 998
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984).
158. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 6 and 138.
160. Judge Easterbrook, sitting for the Seventh Circuit, is not alone in this decision. Since the
Levit decision, the Sixth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have also adopted the literal-approach to
the interplay between sections 547 and 550. See cases cited supra note 15.
161. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g 86 B.R. 545 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988), revg sub nom.
Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986).
162. See generally Borowitz, supra note 33.
163. If the guaranteed loan is paid back during the 90-day to one-year preference avoidance
period, the lender will be required to pay these funds back to the trustee for redistribution. See I 1
U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 550(a)(1).
164. Judge Easterbrook discounted the equity theory when he addressed the interplay be-
tween sections 547(b) and 550(a)(1) in Bonded Financial Services v. European American Bank,
838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988) stating: "There is a related, and more nettlesome, question about
the use of equitable powers under [section] 550(a) .... We have serious doubts both about the
amount of equity in Lender's position.., and about the propriety of judges' declining to enforce
statutes that produce inequitable results." Id. at 894.
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without guarantees can be paid back more than ninety days from the filing
of the bankruptcy petition, but cannot be susceptible to preference recov-
ery.1 65 This occurs regardless of the unguaranteed creditor's relationship
with the debtor; it occurs even if the creditor is more akin to an insider.
In order to equalize the discrepancies listed above, courts should imple-
ment the "fortuitous recipient" exception. The "fortuitous recipient" ex-
ception creates a rebuttable presumption. If the trustee can establish the
five criteria within section 547(b), the noninsider creditor will be presumed
to be in sufficient control to merit recovery under section 550(a)(1). The
burden of proof will then shift to the noninsider to rebut the presumption.
If the noninsider can prove the transfer was not caused by leverage exer-
cised over the debtor, the logical link will be broken and the noninsider
creditor will be protected from recovery as a fortuitous recipient.
This procedure is in line with the equitable powers inherent in a bank-
ruptcy court 1 66 "In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction the bankruptcy
court has the power to sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see
that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of the bankrupt
estate."1 67 If the trustee is empowered to recover from the guaranteed cred-
itor but not from the unguaranteed creditor, injustice and unfairness will
result.
PAUL T. WRYCHA
165. A creditor that is paid back more than ninety days from the filing of the bankruptcy
petition and does not hold a guarantee from an insider of the debtor will not be susceptible to
recovery under section 550. This may occur even in a situation where the transfer was made
under circumstances of bad faith. For example, suppose the creditor is a close friend of the insider
who controls the debtor. As long as the creditor does not have a guarantee, the payments will not
be recovered.
166. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939).
167. Id. at 307-08.
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